Table of contents
Editorial: Focus on the Horn of Africa
by Prof. Gloria T. Emeagwali
chief editor of AfricaUpdate
Central Connecticut State University was host to over
one hundred scholars and students on the 19th of November 1994, at a
Conference on "Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa."
The Keynote Address was delivered by Ambassador David
Shinn of the Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
D.C. He focused on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Horn
of Africa. Ambassador David Shinn has served in various capacities in
ten African countries including Burkina Faso, Mauretania, Cameroon,
Nine other scholars presented papers on a range of issues
including a general background of the Somali-speaking peoples, African
Americans and the Somali crisis, the role of the IMF and the World Bank
and the logistical needs of Somaliland. Speakers included the former
Under-Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Abdirahim Abbey Farah;
Dr. Julius Ihonvbere of the University of Texas; Dr. Amina Adan of Central
Orange College, California; Dr. Hussein Adam of Holy Cross College,
Massachusetts; Dr. Walton Brown, Central Connecticut State University;
Dr. Stacey Close, Eastern Connecticut State University; Osman Ali, Editor
of the Horn of Africa; Isak Warsame of Philadelphia and Abdulrahman
of the Department of Health, Massachusetts.
Amongst registered Conference participants were scholars
from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, the
University of Hartford and Harvard University. Contributing members
of the CCSU faculty were Doctors Haines Brown, Felton Best, and Evelyn
A conference of this nature required not only financial
support but also the good will of the administration. Dr. Karen Beyard,
Vice-President of Academic Affairs, Dean Clarke of Arts and Sciences
and Dr. Tim Rickard of the International Affairs Center, Central Connecticut
State University assisted in various ways and deserve special thanks.
We will always be grateful to Ambassador David Shinn of the State Department
for agreeing to give the Keynote Address. What is equally noteworthy
is that the Ambassador accommodated an avalanche of questions and observations
with the utmost tact and patience and stayed on to the very end of the
Special thanks and acknowledgements must go to the Members
of the Somaliland Committee: Ahmed Jamal (Chair), Mohamoud Dualeh (Liaison
Officer), Abdulla Hussein (Secretary), Ahmed Abdi and Ahmed Ahmed (Finance
and Accounting), Abdi Musa and Kaysi Gedi. Without their assistance
the conference would hardly have been such a great success. We at CCSU
believe that collaboration with various African communities here in
the United States or elsewhere is a pre-requisite for genuine intellectual
and social interaction. African programs must not alienate themselves
from the people whose history and civilisation are being celebrated.
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Return to Table of Contents.
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS STATES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
being excerpts of the
AMBASSADOR DAVID H. SHINN,
DIRECTOR EAST AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Everyone has heard about the crises in Africa. Some of
the worst news comes from the Horn of Africa. Periodic famine throughout
the Horn, a failed state in Somalia, a civil war in southern Sudan,
ethnic clashes in Kenya, problems in northern Uganda, and dissident
activity in Djibouti.
The bad news is so noisy, it is hard to hear the good
news. But there are a few quiet successes and some progress to report
in the Horn. Uganda is moving ahead economically and politically at
a brisk pace. Kenya remains economically important and continues to
pursue economic policy reform. New governments in Eritrea and Ethiopia,
where peace has returned after many years of war, are grappling courageously
with the same issues. Starvation has ended in Somalia and crop production
is 75 percent of pre-war levels.
Both the problems and the progress ignore borders. Refugees,
for example, cross borders by definition. Four years of intermittent
civil war in Somalia have forced thousands of Somalis to flee their
country to the relative safety of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.
What can we do about this and the other huge costs--human
and material--of ethnic strife? We can try to prevent the strife in
the first place, working with regional organizations like the organization
of African states, intergovernmental authority for drought and development,
individual governments and non-governmental organizations to reduce
and eliminate the causes of conflict in the region. We call this crisis
mitigation and it is a very important part of our job.
When--despite our best efforts--a crisis erupts, we work
to get the parties off the battlefield and into negotiations. Again,
we work with the O.A.U., the United Nations, regional states, and anyone
else who can help get the fighting stopped and the talking started.
Economic reform is important throughout the Horn of Africa.
Kenya and Uganda are at different stages of transition to market economies.
We are helping wherever and whenever we can for we believe that this
is the only route to economic development and stability in those countries.
This commitment dovetails with our active support of U.S. commercial
interests in the Horn and the efforts of our embassies to promote U.S.
On the political side, we are actively supporting the
wave of democratic reforms sweeping Africa. Kenya had its first free
and open election two years ago. Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are all
moving towards elections. Only Sudan clings to military rule, and shows
no sign of moving towards democracy while any kind of national government
remains illusive in Somalia.
Working with the governments of the greater Horn through
the inter-governmental authority on drought and development, and interested
donors, we are developing a new strategy to address the problems of
the greater Horn of Africa. Food security is key to reducing the economic
and political vulnerability of the people of the greater Horn.
In July 1994, US Aid estimated that 25 million people
in the region were in need of good assistance. Nearly 14 million of
them were refugees and internally displaced persons who fled their homes
to escape civil conflict. The other 11 million were victims of drought.
This Horn of Africa initiative is designed to develop a joint problem-solving
approach that attacks the root causes of food insecurity created by
natural causes and man-made civil conflict.
The Ambassador then proceeded to identify specific problems,
crises and possible solutions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia,
Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda and concluded that the Horn is a reflection
of Africa as a whole -- "A region of remarkable diversity where there
is some good news to report, some bad and everywhere people struggling
to overcome a difficult political past and economic present."
Ambassador Shinn's Focus on Somalia: Some Comments
by Mary Beth Raissen
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
What future for Somalia? In his keynote address Ambassador
David H. Shinn, Director, East African Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
commented on the U.N. Security Council's recent decision to terminate
the mandate for the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), by the end of
March 1995. The decision, which has already set the withdrawal of the
remaining 15,000 U.N. peacekeepers in motion, was taken in view of "the
intractability of Somalia's political problems" and "repeated attacks
on relief workers and peacekeepers" as well as "frequent outbursts of
major interfactional and clan fighting."
Despite considerable personnel, resource and financial
outlay by the United Nations, Somalia has thus far eluded outside attempts
to achieve political stability. Given the 1991 unilateral declaration
of independence for the "Republic of Somaliland" by the leaders of Somalia's
northwestern region, is the two-state solution a viable option?
Ambassador Shinn did not address this question. Instead,
he stressed that the goal of the United States in northwestern Somalia,
as in other regions of the country, was "to help people and avoid political
minefields." Accordingly, he indicated that the United States would
not "take any action that might prejudice the future of the region's
relationship with other parts of Somalia." In his view such "was an
internal matter for Somalis to resolve."
On the question of Somaliland, Ambassador Shinn stressed
during the Q and A session that the U.N. political mission for Somalia's
national reconciliation, which would continue even after UNOSOM's withdrawal,
"had no predesigns for Somalia." Furthermore, the United States "was
not going to get out front on Somaliland recognition." Rather; it would
follow the lead of regional organizations, particularly the Organization
of African Unity, on that matter.
When asked why the U.S. Government had not aided Somaliland
directly, Ambassador Shinn explained that the region had experienced
"little or no starvation" compared to the south. Even though the original
U. N. objective "was to cover the whole country, no one had become deeply
involved in the northeast or northwest." However, he indicated that
"some work had been done by NGOs." Since the summer of 1991, the United
States had provided $6.5 million to NGOs and "a far larger amount to
groups like the ICRC, MSF, and UNHCR for regional programs" in Somalia's
In response to a question concerning U.N. arms control
and disarmament policy, Ambassador Shinn observed that disarmament for
all intent and purposes had failed. While some heavy weapons had been
subject to an arms control policy of cantonment, it remained to be seen
what would happen to the weapons held in storage after UNOSOM's departure.
He cited three options: destruction; placement in a third party's safe-keeping;
return to the Somalis.
Overall, Ambassador Shinn stressed that "the international
community, including the United States is not abandoning Somalia." He
noted that in the future U.S. activities in that country would "focus
on the health and agricultural sectors," with U.S. aid ranging between
$31-$38 million during the next two fiscal years.
Return to Table of Contents.
The World Bank and IMF in Somalia
by Julius Ihonvbere
University of Texas, Austin
The imposition of IMF monetarist recovery prescriptions
in Somalia in 1984-85 did not help matters in any way. Drought had devastated
agricultural output in 1978-80 and caused severe strains on foreign
exchange earnings. At the same time, the war in the Ogaden had drained
scarce resources and diverted money from maintenance of infrastructures
and social services to war. In 1981, the IMF moved in and forced the
government to create a dual exchange rate, liberalize the economy, privatize
/ commercialize public services, devalue the currency, impose user-fees
on a range of public services, and drastically cut back public sector
spending. In themselves, these were unrealistic policies in a poverty-stricken,
backward, and fragile economy.
In typical fashion, the IMF had overlooked the specificities
of the Somali socio-political terrain; the credibility of the leadership
and its ability to impose/implement harsh monetarist policies; the ability
of non-bourgeois forces to resist the imposed policies; the character
and direction of political contestations; the room for manoeuvre in
the global system; prevailing ideological discourses; and the degree
of legitimacy and hegemony which the neo-colonial state enjoyed at that
It is not sufficient to bring supposedly well packaged
policies from the United States and force them on vulnerable, unstable,
foreign dominated and severely distorted political economies and expect
miracles to occur. For it to have the required impact, such policies
must reflect the specificities and aspirations of the local social formation,
and serve the interest of the local economy rather than creditors and
The drought of 1984 threw the implementation of the IMF
prescriptions off balance. The drought created such pain, tension, uncertainty,
and disaster, that the Barre regime could not mobilize the courage to
force on the people the difficult medicine prescribed by the IMF. To
make matters worse, Saudi Arabia, Somalia's largest market for its livestock
exports, imposed a ban on Somali livestock thus effectively halving
its foreign exchange earnings. Though Somalia broke with the IMF over
the difficulties generated and/or accentuated by the prescription in
1984, it was forced back to implementing the program in 1985.
Like in most cases in Africa, compliance with IMF policies,
at great cost to the state and its agencies and agents, did not bring
in new money or new investors; neither did it open up developed country
markets to Somalia.
In 1987 Somalia broke with the IMF again and refused to continue the imposed
foreign exchange auctions. In retaliation, the IMF "stopped all its
lending to Somalia." Such an action was enough to signal other lenders,
suppliers, credit clubs and donors to terminate support and aid to Somalia.
The consequences as described by The Economist was that "shopkeepers
cleared their shelves in Mogadishu, and industrial output trailed off
due to shortages of raw materials and spare parts, forcing the government
back to the negotiating table." At this time, having been forced back
to the negotiating table by deepening economic crisis, inflation, lack
of credit, and basic goods, Somalia lacked power to argue with the IMF.
A combination of pressures on Somalia not only made the
regime more desperate but also destroyed the already fragile basis of
the economy and society. As Linda de Hoyos noted, "By the end of 1988,
Somalia was forced to impose a new structural adjustment program, this
time under the aegis of the World Bank, but with no new funds coming
either from the Fund or the creditor banks..." donors and investors
kept their distance as Somalia disintegrated politically."
Under the IMF and World Bank, and despite the ruin of
the economy, Somalia paid in 1989 a full 47.4% of its export earnings
to debt service. Between 1987 and 1989, the currency was devalued by
460%. "The devaluations raised the price of imported goods and food.
It was in the context of these debilitating conditions,
and under extreme pressure from deepening economic crisis, a very restless
urban population, opposition from neglected clans and communities, demands
from creditors, and direct military challenges, that the Barre regime
resorted to widespread repression, human rights abuses, and the massacre
of defenseless women and children.
Whatever legitimacy the regime had left was eroded by
the imposition of the Structural Adjustment program. Policies of devaluation
rendered the currency virtually worthless. The program of desubsidization
made life difficult for vulnerable groups especially children, women,
and the unemployed.
In a poverty-stricken society, this was a prescription
for the death of millions who had relied heavily on state support for
survival and for access to social and medical services. The cost of
food and transportation more than doubled and urban restlessness increased
with the implementation of policies aimed at cutting the size of the
bureaucracy. The privatization and commercialization program only increased
the power of foreign creditors and business interests as they had the
foreign exchange to buy up some of the public corporations. This also
precipitated a massive lay-off of able bodied workers. In a society
without extensive credit facilities and without welfare programs, these
policies increased tensions, crime, prostitution, uncertainty, frustrations,
At the end of the day, neither the orthodox stabilization
or structural adjustment packages of the IMF and World Bank could strengthen
the state; increase the legitimacy of the government and its agencies
and agents; improve trade relations; improve on local productivity;
promote a local environment for consensual politics; establish institutions
for accommodating the opposition and resolving the national question;
and lay the foundation for democracy, accountability, popular participation,
empowerment of the people and their communities, and democratization.
Rather, increasing difficulties following the failure
of the Ogaden campaign, and the failure of IMF and World Bank programs,
made the regime very insecure and desperate. Its response to the situation
was massive repression, wanton human rights abuses, attacks against
other clans, and the elimination of all real and imagined opposition
Return to table of contents.
Internet and Africa Studies
by Haines Brown, C.C.S.U. History Department
People look upon the new information age with mixed feelings,
for undoubtedly much will be lost as well as much gained.
Ambivalence is particularly manifest with regard to Africa.
Unsettled conditions and limited resources in Africa mean that digital
communications are less developed than elsewhere. Also, while the cost
of computer-based telecommunications might seem modest enough in industrial
societies, in Africa its costs are so great that Internet remains inaccessible
to the bulk of Africa's population.
Although the direction of current development implies that in not too many years,
inexpensive and reliable digital communications will be effectively
accessible for the bulk of Africa's population, the problem remains.
Telecommunication systems are not owned by their users, and so the issue
of control and whose interests are served remains, despite universal
Meanwhile, significant resources for Africa studies are
appearing on Internet. To illustrate the possibilities, I will mention
those available here at C.C.S.U. and briefly describe how to reach them.
This newsletter, AfricaUpdate, is being placed
in electronic archives on Internet. To read or download past issues,
you must have access to Internet through a university or commercial
provider and employ a World Wide Web browser such as Lynx or one of
the new graphical browsers (Mosaic, NetScape, WebExplorer, etc.). Web-supported
hyperlinks to connect resources has profound implications, and Web access
is growing at an extraordinary rate.
A known Internet resource has a Uniform Resource Locator
(URL), which identifies its name and location. A Web browser allows
you to select or type in a URL so that you can connect to the resource.
It is important to type the URL exactly, including case and punctuation.
For example, to reach information on how to locate Internet resources,
enter the URL:
The URL for the set of AfricaUpdate archives is:
This takes you to a list of the AfricaUpdate issues held in the archives,
and if you select one of them, that issue is displayed so that you might
read or download it to your computer.
Also, there is here a set of African Studies archives
and links to other resources on Internet relevant to African studies
at C.C.S.U. The URL of this Africa Studies World Wide Web page is:
Your contributions to these documentary archives and suggestions on how they
might be improved are most welcome.
Contact me at:
Return to Table of Contents.
Authoritarian Continuity in the Kenyan Election Aftermath
by Frank Holmquist and Michael Ford
Many people sacrificed a great deal in the process of
forcing the political opening in Kenya. Careers were derailed, people
were jailed, some were tortured, and some died.
So when the one-party system ended in December 1991, and
multi-party elections occurred in December 1992, democracy movement
advocates had high hopes for dampening social and especially ethnic
tensions, less corruption, and a regime that would better manage the
economy, liberate civil society (i.e.. all organization between state
and the family), and better protect civil rights. Regime supporters
expected almost the mirror opposite -- civil strife, growing ethnic
tensions, political instability, and economic decline.
The election brought President Moi back to power with
only 36% of the vote. In a winner-take-all Parliamentary structure (unlike
South Africa's), the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU),
was returned with a solid majority of 108 seats out of 188. The regime
and its supporters proved to be better predictors of the election aftermath,
in part because the regime helped realize its own worst scenario.
The result was an authoritarian continuity that left opposition
supporters and much of the general public disillusioned about the return
to democracy. Many people argue that nothing has changed, but the same
people invariably acknowledge a more enlivened civil society. If the
political opening has allowed more talk but few returns from it, most
observers believe the talk, and the organization growing out of it,
are necessary precursors to more fundamental change.
Understanding the current social forces at play requires
our tracing their role during the opening of the political system in
the late l980s. At that time in Kenya, and indeed throughout much of
Africa and the Third World, democracy became the dominant "language"
of protest. In Kenya this language came to be strongly voiced by so-called
establishment churches and the liberal professions, especially lawyers.
The latter found themselves dragged into opposition politics as they
were harassed, jailed, and worse, when they took on cases of state civil
rights abuses. The churches were drawn to opposition politics in the
face of state abuse of power that could not be reconciled with deeply
held moral beliefs. Like the lawyers, leading churchmen also became
objects of regime harassment.
The broad urban middle class and the small African bourgeoisie
were also drawn to the democracy movement. The urban middle class expanded
enormously after independence largely in state employment, but also
in the growing private sector.
By the late l98Os international recession, debt, and local
economic stagnation, caused incomes to erode precipitously. With the
demise of the political left, the small African bourgeoisie, like the
middle class, found no threat to property in the democracy movement.
For some, ethnicity served as a catalyst for recruitment
to the democracy movement. Due to a host of historical colonial and
post-colonial reasons, ethnic sentiment has been the primary building
block of national level political coalitions. The Kenyatta regime's
bias toward the Kikuyu was followed by the Moi regime's bias toward
the Kalenjin. Thus the predominantly Kikuyu middle class and bourgeoisie
became arrayed against a regime that felt surrounded by powerful social
forces. The Moi regime all-but-defined civil society organization as
Kikuyu-dominated and hence a zone of opposition. As a result state repression
grew more intense as the 1980s progressed.
Despite the post-election authoritarian continuity, most
opposition leaders remain guardedly optimistic about the future. Most
will acknowledge that President Moi is clearly the leading candidate
in the next elections, constitutionally required to take place by 1997.
Meanwhile opposition forces are united on the need for
a level electoral playing field, the need for a level legal and political
playing field which requires a constitutional convention and a new constitution,
and a significant diminution of sweeping and repressive presidential
powers that were largely inherited from the colonial era. Just how to
convene such a conference with results that will have the force of law
is a tactical matter over which there is much debate. The operating
principle is, however, that while the political opening has had a positive,
though limited impact, the problems of partial democracy can only be
solved by more democracy.
Return to Table of Contents.
African Studies Notebook
A Student View of the Conference of November 19th:
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
by Agnes Skowron, C.C.S.U.
David Shinn, the Keynote speaker in the conference on
the Horn of Africa, addressed the problems and progress of the various
countries in the region. His comments on the country of Somalia in particular
generated many responses from the audience.
In his address, Shinn noted that Somalia's difficulties
can be traced to a series of conflicts which began with the abortive
attempt in 1977 to regain the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Perhaps this disastrous
event may not have occurred had Somalia remained a country ruled by
a civilian (and representative) government. Therefore, it may be argued
that Somalia's troubles were initiated by Muhammed Barre, who came to
power in 1969 in a military coup. His Somali Revolutionary Socialist
party, created in 1976, formed the executive branch of government.
Armed domestic opposition to Barre began in the north
in 1988 with the Isaak-based Somali National Movement (SNM) and was
brutally suppressed. Other clan-backed groups joined the anti-government
struggle, which caused Barre to flee on January 27th, 1991. However,
the factions which collectively fought against Siyord Barre and his
government turned against each other and created division in the country.
In May 1991 the northwest part of Somalia ceded from the
country. Calling their country the Republic of Somaliland, the people
concluded that after events such as the bombardment of Hargeysa by Barre's
army, they could not remain part of a larger Somali state. The Republic
of Somaliland, however, has not been recognized by the international
In the south, fighting erupted between rival factions
including those of transitional president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and rival
Mohammed Farah Aidid. Fighting began in the fall of 1991 and has continued,
intermittently, to this day.
Food and access to food was a major weapon for the Mogadishu-based
clans in 1991 and 1992. By August 1992 up to one-third of all Somali's
faced death by starvation due to drought and fighting, which not only
kept farmers from planting crops but also denied many access to food.
By this time one million people had fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti
In December 1992, a UN sanctioned and U.S. led deployment
of over 30,000 troops began to ensure distribution of food aid. UN mediators
in early 1993 attempted unsucessfully to bring together the various
Somali faction leaders to restore peace.
Somalia's political problems remain unsolved to the present
day. As a result, the UN was prompted to end UNOSOM's mandate by the
end of March 1995. Attacks on relief workers and "peacekeepers" and
outbursts of clan fighting also contributed to the UN's decision to
remove the remaining 15,000 "peacekeepers."
Shinn asserted that neither the international community
nor the U.S. is abandoning Somalia. However, he stated that the U.S.
does not want to risk the lives of Americans and cannot afford to pay
for a military presence which is no longer useful. Instead, U.S. aid
will be given where programs can be carried out.
Many members of the audience expressed grievances about
U.S. foreign policy toward Somaliland. For one thing, many citizens
of Somaliland are angered that their country has not been recognized
by the U.S. People were also angry that the U.S. did nothing to help
the people of northwestern Somalia when Barre's army savagely suppressed
an uprising against the oppressive government. People accused the U.S.
of neglecting Africa and focusing instead on helping European (mainly
eastern European). Some Somalis believe that the U.S. has an aversion
towards Muslims, which prevents the U.S. from helping somaliland. While
the U.S. may have had conflicts with fundamentalist Islamic sects, it
is doubtful that the U.S. has any prejudices to followers of Islam.
However, people are justified in stating that U.S. foreign policy in
many African countries has been negligent, if not negligible, and that
it has largely been Eurocentric. Perhaps with more information about
Africa (attained through education, conferences, etc.), Americans will
extend their attention and aid to the struggling countries of Africa.
Return to Table of Contents.
African Studies Notebook
by Cazzie Iverson, President of the African Studies Club,
I. Reflections on Ambassador Shinn's Remarks
On November 19th I attended the lecture given by Ambassador
David Shinn. He gave a very insightful speech on the problems and measures
taken to ensure that the Horn of Africa is moving towards free elections
and democracy. He also pointed out measures and aid that the United
States Government has given to the Horn of Africa.
The problems discussed were famines, a failed state in
Somalia, a civil war in southern Sudan, ethnic clashes in Kenya, problems
in northern Uganda, and dissident activity in Djibouti.
On the positive side, Uganda is moving ahead economically
and politically. Kenya pursues economic policy reform. There are new
governments in Eritrea and Ethiopia, where peace has returned after
many years of war. Starvation has subsided in Somalia and crop production
is 75 percent of prewar levels.
"Both the good and bad problems ignore borders," Shinn
said. He pointed out an alternative that would prevent strife in the
first place: working with regional organizations, intergovernmental
authority for drought relief and development, and individual governments
and NGOs to reduce and eliminate the causes of conflict in the region.
"We work to get the parties in mediation and off the battlefield." I
have a problem with this because Shinn makes it seem as though those
who have differences can work together without quarrels. This is a good
attempt to illustrate methods of assistance, but as we see differences
create problems under democracy and capitalism.
U.S. commercial and trade interests are evident. Politically
the U.S. supports democracy and its reforms, but democracy is failing
to achieve justice here in the U.S. The poor get poorer, and the rich
get richer. A democratic government should be by the people and for
the people does it really work as such? Democracy supposedly addresses
the problems of the Horn of Africa which colonization started. Shinn
said, "food security is the key to reducing economic and political vulnerability"
of the people of the Horn, I have no comment! It is said that the Horn
of Africa initiative is designed to develop a joint problem-solving
approach that attacks the root causes of food insecurity created by
natural causes and man-made civil conflicts. People are not fighting
because they don't have food in their stomachs, they're fighting because
of a divide and conquer ideology instilled in the Horn.
It is said that the U.S. is helping to ensure legislative
elections and representative government. Why is the U.S. trying to impose
its political values on others? Do they consider them backward and think
it's their duty to civilize the backward world, as did the militant
expansionist,T. D. Roosevelt? In the U.S. we have an abundance of heinous
crime committed every day. What does this say about democracy? Why does
Somalia remain the most troubled country on the continent? These problems
have existed since colonization and remind me of the U.S. Civil War.
Shinn said, "The Horn is a reflection of Africa as a whole.
. . a region of remarkable diversity where there is good news and bad
news, and everywhere people struggling to overcome a difficult political
past and an economic present." I agree but he didn't point out why these
problems still exist, their origins, etc. It takes more than just negotiation
to solve conflicts. Resistance, agitation and other revolutionary methods
II. African Studies Club attends ASA Meeting
The 37th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association
was held in Toronto, Canada November 3rd to 7th, 1994. Some members
of the African Studies Club attended, accompanied by Dr. Gloria T. Emeagwali
and Dr. Evelyn Phillips of the African Studies Committee.
Africa--its past, its present and its future was discussed.
Each panel revolved around a specific regional theme. I was specially
fascinated by the topic which dealt with colonialism in Kenya. It was
pointed out that Kenya was colonized by the British during the nineteenth
century. Kenya was attractive and was used by European and American
aristocrats for extra curricular activities. Raw materials such as ivory
and cattle hide were very popular. The Malibu system was mentioned and
reserves were said to play a major role. The problem was that many settlers
and foreigners gained African land and its use was strictly in the interest
of imperialism. The presenter said that Africans had mobility, although
segregation existed and that the system was less oppressive but I wondered
whether the inhabitants of the area accepted this situation passively,
Generally I enjoyed the trip. It was intellectually stimulating
and the panelists showed their expertise in their various fields.
Please address comments to Gloria Emeagwali