Vol. VI, Issue 2 (Spring 1999): Southern Africa

Table of Contents

Editorial: Southern Africa

By Gloria Emeagwali - Chief Editor

Many are the challenges facing South Africa at the present time. Should the victims of Apartheid seek revenge or render forgiveness? Should there be reparations to the victims of Apartheid as Wole Soyinka suggests in The Burden of Memory; The Muse of Forgiveness (OUP, 1999)? Should desegregation of education take place by force or through progressive legislation? What about land? Should South Africa follow an aggressive policy of land redistribution or should Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in his earlier years be the definitive guide? What about apartheid debt, 90% of which is owed to four creditor nations, namely, the United States, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom? South Africa's problems do not end there. The survivors of apartheid terrorism have to consider the impact of biological warfare and the various sterilization programs, mind altering substances and drugs and toxins developed and utilized against apartheid activists and the Black population in general. What are the long term effects of the chemical and biological agents deployed in the past? To what extent have race-based genetic engineering programs been completely eradicated?

In this issue of Africa Update we focus on some of these issues to some extent. Our main thrust, however, is the socio-historical and political context of South Africa's history. Dr. Warren Perry, an outstanding archeologist in his field, challenges the conventional settler model account of late 18th century and early nineteenth century South Africa. Perry combined his findings from his own research in Swaziland with those of other archeologists on the basis of ecological and geopolitical categories. He discovered there were major discrepancies between the expectations of the conventional settler model and material and archeological reality

Gani Yoroms of the Center for Democratic Studies, Abuja, Nigeria leaps into the last decade of the 20th century and the feverish political activities following the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. He discusses the role of CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) and the African National Congress exploring in the process some of the mechanisms of constitutional democracy and the 1994 elections.

We thank Gani for his excellent analysis of aspects of "the tortuous road" to democratization.

South Africa goes to the polls in June this year to hold its second democratic election since the dismantling of the apartheid state. Thabo Mbeki seems the likely winner. He is a pragmatist and so continues a trend begun by Mandela. It will be interesting to see what happens.

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An Archaeological Test of the Settler Model Account

of the Mfecane/Difaqane

By Dr. Warren R. Perry, Central Connecticut State University


In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the political and cultural form of southeastern Africa changed in an irrevocable way. Social relations were drastically reorganized from kin-based ranked social relations to age-grade units of state society. Productive cycles were disrupted and trade relations realigned. People shifted their allegiances and reformulated group identities many times as warfare and famine swept the region. By all accounts it was a period of great strife, suffering, sorrow and, for some, triumph. This period, known as the Mfecane or the Difaqane is characterized by the rise of the Zulu State under Shaka.

This paper considers the political and economic forces underlying state formation in southeastern Africa. Most of the work on this topic is based on documentary and oral sources. However, an increasing body of information from archaeological contexts can be brought to bear on examining various hypotheses on the causes of the Mfecane/ Difaqane. Key to many of these theories is an underlying model, ironically named the settler model. In this model the European settlers have been excluded as a major cause of the dislocations of the Mfecane/Difaqane. When subjected to archaeological data, this model serves as a poor basis for understanding this crucial period of history.


The standard versions suggests that conflict between different groups in the Mfolozi-Phongola region over the need for grazing land resulted in livestock raiding by the more powerful polities, and extensive migrations by the less powerful. Refugees on the move were attacking other polities in their path as they fled the Mfolozi-Phongola region. The scale of devastation is said to have been heretofore unknown in southern Africa. The state of contention among the groups in this region culminated in the emergence of a hierarchy of centralized military polities, at the apex of which stood the Zulu State.

Most explanations of these events have been posed in terms of African internal dynamics, emphasizing catastrophic population pressures, ecological conditions and increasing cattle herds resulting in depleting resources and overgrazing. Several Africanist historians have tried to relate conflicts over control of the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay to the rise of the Zulu State.

Despite the fact that each of these models draws on different variables, and has obviously different sympathies, at root, all these propositions share a set of assumptions that are common to the settler model. The first assumption is the idea that South African society was composed of discrete ethnic groups that had their origin in the past and persisted into recent times. The second assumption is that there was little systemic interaction between these groups. The third assump-

tion is the Zulucentric focus, namely that these social relations were disrupted in the early 19th century by the Mfecane/Difaqane.

An alternative analysis that undermines the geographic localization and European passivity of the settler model can be found in the work of Cobbing. He contends that the Mfecane/ Difaqane is linked to disruptive European forces, specifically slave raiding, emanating from the Cape, and other European colonies in southern Africa.

In sum, the settler model sees the rise of the Zulu state as a local development and ultimately responsible for the Mfecane/Difaqane. The result of Zulu state formation appears to be the conquest of and disruption of life for the various independent African people of southeastern Africa. Cobbing's vision suggests a more fluid set of cultural interactions among the various African groups with Europeans playing an active role in a complex colonial field.

The scale of the phenomena as well as the timing of disruptions is open to archaeological analysis. It is to the archaeological assessment of these ideas that I next turn.


A broad survey of mostly published and some unpublished archaeological materials from the period of the Mfecane/Difaqane was conducted and combined with data from a site survey in Swaziland. A database of 159 sites was established to evaluate the utility of the settler model in explaining Southeast African political economy. The sites have been grouped into the major ecological and geopolitical regions of Southeastern Africa: Zulu land, Swaziland, the Eastern and Western Transvaal, and the Free State. Dating the sites is particularly problematic; nonetheless, I attempted to further group sites into pre and post Mfecane/ Difaqane, i.e. sites from the eighteenth century or earlier and sites from the nineteenth century.

The settler model has specific temporal and spatial trajectory that compares with archaeological results from these times and places. Key changes proposed by the model include population growth, ecological degradation, social hierarchy, state formation, European trade, and settlement disruption all begin in the areas of Zululand and spread from there to the other areas. Moreover, the settler model assumes a general change from local scale social interactions to larger spatial interactions integrating southeastern Africa relative to the Zulu core region.

The table summarizes both the expectations for key archaeologically recoverable variables under the assumptions of the settler model and the results of the archaeological analyses.


The settler model predicts a large population in the core areas of Zulu state formation with the rest of southeastern Africa showing relatively low population sizes that increase with the arrival of the Zulu state.

Population sizes were measured by using the correlate of site size. The results show some significant discrepancies from the settler model expectations. The demographic situations in Eastern Transvaal and the Free State are perhaps the most interesting. In terms of regional demographics, it seems that during the earlier periods the Eastern Transvaal and Free State populations were significantly larger than that of Zululand, but during the later periods as the Zululand population increased, the Eastern Transvaal and Free State populations underwent an overall reduction suggesting a possible population shift from these areas into Zululand and Swaziland.


The settler model assumes that with the exception of Zululand and Swaziland (which might exhibit slightly greater degrees of social inequality prior to state formation), the existence of relatively egalitarian agropastoral communities prior to the formation of the Zulu state.

Social hierarchy can be assessed from the Southern African data with such indicators as the existence of exotic materials, the form of socially central settlements, the size of cattle enclosures, the culling patterns of herds from more and less prestigious settlements, and the overall organization of the settlement hierarchy. My studies drew on all of these variables, most systematically investigating the organization of the regional settlement hierarchies, as seen in the site-size histograms, and differential control over cattle, as seen in stock enclosure sizes.

The general results of the regional site size analysis and artifactual analysis are complex and varied. Only the settlement hierarchies from Zululand, show an increase in social hierarchy, with all other regional hierarchies decreasing. Simultaneously, there are other kinds of archaeological evidence in all regions, that indicate discrepancies from the settler model. The most intriguing area is the Free State whose early bimodal distribution contained a very large site which is 4 times larger than the largest in Zululand and is the largest site in the entire southeast African sample. The faunal assemblage, although dominated by wild game is characterized by an elite cattle-culling pattern. Glass beads, rock gongs and miniature pots suggesting ritual significance and burials with stone-lined tombs and many grave goods are present. Finally, stone tools, red ochre chunks, bored stones and undecorated grass-tempered pottery typical of ethnographic pastroforagers is also present.

The most provocative regional relationship is seen in the transition from earlier to later periods accompanied by a 34% decrease in total sites for all areas except for Zululand and Swaziland which showed a 33% increase in total sites. This strongly suggests that Zululand and Swaziland were experiencing similar transformations which were having the opposite affect upon the other regions.

Thus the settler model's prediction of increasing social hierarchy after the Mfecane/Difaqane is not supported. The evidence from these limited analyses indicates that the situation was far more complex.


Differential possession of cattle and their accumulation are key indicators of social inequality among Southern African polities. Consequently, cattle enclosure size can heuristically be used as a surrogate to inform on status, wealth and power, and hence class and state formation in southern African societies. The cattle enclosure sizes were estimated from the archaeologically recovered remains, and from them an estimate of the number of animal units was developed. The Settler Model predicts that as prestige items, cattle should become increasingly concentrated in the hands of state elite in the Zululand and Swaziland state formation areas and should generally decline in both number and level of concentration in other areas.

The cattle enclosure analysis shows that all areas had unimodal enclosure size distributions during both periods except for eastern Transvaal which had a tri-modal distribution for both periods. This suggests differential possession of cattle in the Eastern Transvaal before and after the Mfecane/Difaqane. In addition, every region, except Eastern Transvaal showed a decrease in the number of cattle enclosures through time. However, if we look at each region in terms of total enclosure areas presumably housing livestock, mean enclosure size, and estimates of animal units a different more complex pattern emerges. Zululand and Eastern Transvaal showed an increase in all of these categories while Swaziland and Free State exhibit a decrease in these categories.

This suggests the existence of a long and continuous social hierarchy in the Eastern Transvaal unlike Zululand where state formation appears to have begun after the Mfecane/Difaqane. This evidence is also at odds with the settler model and suggests that state formation in Zululand was not the first such incident in Southeast Africa and may indicate interaction with Europeans in the Delagoa Bay area well before the Mfecane/Difaqane.

In Swaziland, Western Transvaal, and Free State there was a decrease in the very categories that increased in Zululand and eastern Transvaal. Though consistent with the settler model for the Western Transvaal and the Free State, it is a surprising result for Swaziland.


The settler model argues that social interactions went from the scale of regional integration to the scale of multi-regional integration with the onset of state formation among the Zulu. Thus the settler model would be most consistent with log-linear distributions in each of the areas except for Free State prior to the Mfecane/Difaqane and a variety of distributions indicative of Zulucentric accumulation after the Mfecane/Difaqane.

As can be seen from Table 1 the results hardly are consistent with the settler model. There clearly are very complex settlement processes happening during post-fifteenth-century Southeast Africa, and the analysis points to effects beyond the regions and indeed beyond the scale of Southeast Africa. Throughout Southeast Africa the pre-Mfecane/Difaqane period was marked, to varying degrees, by concave rank-size patterning, patterns of a relatively few large places and many small places. Post-Mfecane/Difaqane patterns show a more complex situation---Zululand, Swaziland and the Eastern Transvaal show double-convex patterning while Free State appears convex. The rank-size curve for Southeast Africa should be convex in both periods since such an analysis is, according to the settler model, compounding many settlement systems. Instead, all of southeast Africa moves from a concave pattern to a log-linear pattern for larger sites and an increasingly concave pattern as sites become smaller. These are results at odds with the settler model expectations. All of these patterns indicate the effects of large-scale processes, even in the pre-Mfecane/Difaqane period, processes certainly larger than any of the individual regions and processes beyond the scale of Southeast Africa. This suggests the involvement of Europeans in state formation in Southeastern Africa, yet leaves open the issue of the nature of that involvement.


The settler model emphasizes trade in exotics and the disruption of local political processes. There should be a concentration of these items at the elite royal sites in the core areas of Zululand and Swaziland, but there were not early sites in Zululand with European goods.

A number of observations can be made about the distribution of these items. Of all of the sites of both periods the Free State and the Eastern Transvaal had the most and the most diverse kinds with Western Transvaal, and the Cape Frontier also having some. None were located in Zululand, even at royal sites.

These data present serious problems for the settler model. Evidence for trade with Europeans is more prevalent in the pre-state-formation period than after states formed. This would seem to suggest that something other than access to European trade goods was the goal of the Zulu State or if it was their goal they were not successful. The distribution of pre-Mfecane/Difaqane trade goods shows a distinct bias towards mineral production sites, suggesting that the European goods functioned as payment for goods rather than as prestige items in elite competitive duels.


The settler model with its local level integration that gives way to state formation in Zululand, that spreads havoc throughout the rest of Southeastern Africa, does not make a good description of the historical geography evident in the archaeological record. Southeastern Africa is better modeled in the pre-Mfecane/Difaqane period as a network of interrelated social groups, some emphasizing agropastoralism, some pastoralism, and some, from Europe, seeking exotic items and human captives. Processes of accumulation involving the use of cattle and prestige ranking systems came into conflict with processes of accumulation based on capturing human labor and engaging in long-distance mercantile trade. Their collision resulted in the population dislocations, famines, state formations and wars of the Mfecane/Difaqane. Until the interpretive net is cast widely enough to incorporate the actions of Europeans at Port Natal and Delagoa Bay, and their agents operating in the hinterlands of Free State and Western Transvaal, as well as Zululand, the history of the period will remain hidden.

My research and analysis not only suggest that the settler model of the Mfecane/Difaqane is wrong, but also how archaeology can contribute to our understanding by identifying and explaining the contradictions between the archaeological and documentary records caused by the context of colonialism. Such "ambiguities" in the different lines of evidence are places where power lies - power that has resulted in telling histories that affect social relations today. Archaeology has an important role to play in the recovery of the past of Southern Africa. We must begin to identify and formulate new research topics with questions from the contrastive case, that of African captive and cattle raiding, to direct future research strategies.

Racial commodity slavery sponsored captive and cattle raiding which transformed African labor (without military protection) into an available labor pool for external plantations and internal colonies. From the beginning, however, these local and global transformations engendered forms of African resistance and contestation which must be reflected in the material world and cultural landscapes of Southern Africa.


Paper presented for the symposium: Archaeology, Bioanthropology & African Identity in the Diaspora: Theoretical & Methodological Advances, at the 4th World Archaeological Congress in Cape Town, South Africa. January 10-14, 1999. Please do not cite without the author's permission.

Warren Perry is Associate Professor of Anthropology at CCSU. He is also the Associate Directory for Archeology for the African Burial Ground Project. He has conducted research in historical archeology in Southern African and the United States.

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Democratization in South Africa

By J. Gani Yoroms, Center for Democratic Studies Abuja, Nigeria

The release of Nelson Mandela and the relaxation of apartheid laws made the South African democratization process change its course from internal war to peaceful negotiation. The adversarial relationship turned to a negotiated compromise on issues relating to politics, economy and national security. The ANC and the Apartheid government of F.W de Klerk initially dominated the negotiation process with some accord reached between Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. This informal negotiation was transformed to a formal multiparty agreement attended by 50 political parties, business class and public interest groups under the banner of a National Peace Accord. The progress experienced from the National Peace Accord was frustrated by the escalating political violence in black townships between the ANC and the Buthelezi- led Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

The emergence of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was intended to provide a platform for the political interest groups to negotiate a political settlement. The first meeting of CODESA held on the 20 December 1991 was attended by delegates from 18 organizations without the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and IFP.

Some IFP members attended but not on any official capacity. However, the meeting significantly represented all shades of opinion. A declaration of intent was signed by the participants who agreed to commit themselves to (i) an undivided South Africa, (ii) peaceful constitutional change, (iii) a multi-party democracy with universal suffrage and the separation of powers, and (iv) a bill of rights. There were some major areas of disagreement over the interpretation of CODESA I. The ANC saw CODESA as a vehicle for organizing a swift transition from minority rule to a representative majority rule; and F. W. de Klerk's National Party envisaged CODESA as instituting a transition program that would guarantee acceptable modalities for power sharing. Because of this, CODESA II was faced with "enduring lack of trust between the government and the ANC", as there existed "deep differences over federalism and power sharing" (Schneidman 1994:4). Therefore, CODESA II settled for a committee system to deal with the problems in the negotiation process. Thus five committees were established to handle the reincorporation of the Bantustan Homelands into the mainstream South African system; creation of free political climate; transitional government and constitutional principles; and the composition of the constitutional-making body. However, the failure to reach a consensus in CODESA II led to the September 7, 1992 ANC peace protest which recorded 28 deaths and 200 wounded in Ciskei homeland. In the aftermath, President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela met. There, the National Party conceded to the transitional government. Power would be shared between the ANC and the National Party (NP). The ANC and the NP Record of Understanding was opposed by an alliance of Inkhatha Freedom Party (IFP), the White Conservative Party and the homeland governments of Ciskei and Bophuthaswana under the platform of Concerned South African Groups (COSAG) (Schneidman; 1994).These hitches in the democratization process in South Africa resulted from the problematics of attaining majority representation in a multi-ethnic context.

Though the autonomy and protection of the minorities was democratic, a division of South Africa into sub-sovereign units based on ethnic homogeneity would not equally establish the basis for democratic reconciliation within South Africa. Therefore, a constitutional democracy was advocated as the only acceptable approach in the deeply divided society.

The elements of a constitutional democracy include: (a) Executive power-sharing among the political parties representing various ethnic and political interests, (b) A high decree of internal autonomy, (c) Proportional representation and proportional allocation of position in both political - bureaucratic system, and (d) A minority veto on the most vital issues (Lijphart, 1985:6). The idea of constitutional democracy had been floating since the 1970s when the search for viable alternatives began. It is in the light of the above that the Record of Understanding between Mandela and F. W. de Klerk was expanded to incorporate all other political parties. The political parties accepted a government of national unity as a yardstick for national reconciliation where power was shared in a multi-party cabinet and in the parliament for the period of 5 years beginning from 1994.

Each party was to be represented in parliament according to the percentage of votes won and in the Executive Council only if it won at least a 5% vote in the election. This was a prelude to CODESA III which later became a multi-party Negotiation Forum to accommodate various interests (like the Conservative Party, IFP, PAC). However, threats from the IFP and the Afrikaner Volk Front (VF) led by General Viljoen, a retired member of the South African Defence Force, pressed for a confederal South Africa. The opposition groups under Freedom Alliance opposed the April 27, 1994 dateline for the democratic election (Schneidman, 1994:5).

Meanwhile Nelson Mandela demonstrated his craftiness by meeting (in both open and in secret) with the opposition in order to convince them to accept a multi-party democratic system. He was also able to allay the fears of the IFP and VF, despite the deep-seated differences. A major step was taken with the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) as a means for creating a climate for a free political participation and free and fair elections. Thus 21 political parties endorsed TEC on September 7, 1993 with only the IFP in protest. TEC was set up purposely to enable the political interests to direct the transition programme by consensus. Despite the initial problems faced from the Homeland areas of Kwazulu and Bophuthatswana, the TEC succeeded in organizing the first multi-party election in South Africa on 27-28 April, 1994. The election to the National Assembly was by proportional representation with equal division between national and provincial parties. In an election that was conducted by an Independent Electoral Commission, made up of five international members, the ANC won over 65% of the votes cast in the election and Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first Black President of the Government of National Unity, with Thambo Mbeki and F.W de Klerk serving as 1st and 2nd Vice Presidents respectively. Unlike the expectation for regional autonomy the transitional constitution provided a wide range of power for the central government but would delegate power to the regions. The minority veto power was limited to the local level. The minority whites were entitled to 30% seats in the local council election followed by 30% Section by tax and rent payers. The remaining percentage in the local election was to be on a non-racial basis.

Thus was the tortuous road to South African democracy and the elections of 1994.

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Southern African Jubilee Debt Summit: Gauteng Declaration

On the eve of the new millennium, we are witnessing the rapid growth of Jubilee 2000 structures and debt coalitions.

Most people in sub-Saharan Africa live in pervasive poverty, although Southern Africa is not intrinsically poor. Southern Africa is shackled by debt owed to the same forces which initiated, enforced, condoned and sustained slavery and colonialism. Today this debt is both a manifestation and an instrument of the unjust international economic order in which the North dominates the South and the elite in our countries are willing accomplices and beneficiaries.

Indebted nations are pressured to agree to crippling conditionalities to get loans to repay the debt in a deepening spiral of indebtedness. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have caused increasing levels of unemployment, reduced government services, higher prices of food and other basic commodities and intensified poverty.

We commit ourselves to self-determination in working for debt cancellation within a broader concept of Jubilee, including assertion of our sovereignty from Northern domination and transformation towards an alternative global economic system.

For more information contact Jubilee 2000 South Africa at aid-@iafrica.com or Jubilee 2000 Afrika at afrik-@jubilee2000uk.org.

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The Role of Swiss and German Finance

By Mascha Madoerin and Gottfried Wellmer with a contribution by Martina Egli

Summary of the Research Document (excerpts)

This 100 page report was commissioned by the German and Swiss Campaign Coalitions linked to the newly launched international Campaign for Debt Cancellation and Reparations in Southern Africa, and is published in English by Jubilee 2000 South Africa. The paper is meant as one of several contributions that have been published in the course of the last 18 months on the issue of South Africa's foreign debts and the costs which the Apartheid regime caused the neighboring states in Southern Africa.

The research interest of the paper focuses on two fields:

    Firstly, the authors intended to deal once more with the question of how the issue of foreign financing of the Apartheid regime affected the political development in South Africa in the 80s. Two issues are in the forefront: The legitimacy of foreign debt. The question of the long-term effects of Apartheid-caused debt on the young democracy and its economic sustainability. The controversial question of the risks to South Africa's capital market arising from the campaign for debt cancellation is also briefly discussed.
    Secondly, the authors examine the role played by German and Swiss financiers within the framework of foreign financing of the Apartheid regime during the politically critical years.
    A separate part of the paper deals with the issue of reparations and demands compensatory payments from those who profited from Apartheid.
    After 1973 it became obvious that the colonial wars in South Africa's neighbouring countries (Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia), which represented an actual cordon sanitaire for the Apartheid regime, could not be won by the colonial powers. The independence of Mozambique and Angola was imminent.
    Large-scale workers strikes and the Soweto uprising of 1976 reflected the beginning of a new phase in South Africa's political history.
    In this situation, the Apartheid regime decided to embark on its "Total Strategy," which contained comprehensive military, economic and home components serving the single objective of safeguarding the regime. In the implementation of this programme, the government, the administration and public corporations played a decisive role. The incredible waste of resources - seen from today's perspective - put at the disposal of the regime thanks to soaring gold prices and thanks to increasing foreign financing until the mid 80s, served basically to put into practice the survival strategy which left behind devastating results.
    Already at the beginning of the 80s, mainly US companies began to sell their businesses in South Africa. Towards the end of 1982, after the major western countries had once more opted to grant credits to South Africa, the IMF was forbidden to grant loans to South Africa if the institution failed to prove that these resources were not used to perpetuate Apartheid. This proof could not be delivered. On the other hand, foreign banks, the most eager among them major banks from Germany and Switzerland, organised long term loans worth several billions of dollars for the Apartheid state. More comprehensive financial sanctions were only imposed in 1985. Their effect was, however, significantly reduced by several debt rescheduling operations and by the striking loyalty of German and Swiss bankers.
    As is convincingly shown in Part I and in the attached chronology, the decisive issue of the period from 1985 to 1990 was the intensification of Apartheid South Africa's war against its neighbouring countries and against the South African population. The transitional period from 1990 to 1993 was also characterised by a severe policy of internal destabilisation and by the escalation of violence. Only well into 1993 was the Apartheid regime prepared to comply with one of the central conditions for the lifting of sanctions: the holding of democratic elections according to the principle one-person-one-vote.
    The authors are convinced that sanctions and in particular the financial crisis of the Apartheid regime in relation to foreign creditors, played an essential role in getting the regime to the negotiation table. Towards the end of 1989, South Africa was faced with a serious financial crisis in foreign relations. On the other hand, the Apartheid regime used foreign credits as an opportunity to postpone negotiations and to intensify its repression and war. Should the young democratic state now be burdened with the repayment of Apartheid-caused debts at the expense of urgent social expenditure? The many organisations that have joined the campaign clearly say NO.
    Those who stuck to the regime by providing foreign finance are to be considered accomplices. The paper therefore suggests that either 1989 or 1993 be taken as the cut-off year for the demands for debt cancellation and that profit transfers from 1985 to 1993 be considered as a reference for reparation demands. . .

The Most Important Financiers of the Apartheid State

Looking at long term debts, 90% are owed to four creditor countries of the Apartheid regimes: the United States, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Up to 1992, the US mainly held assets with public corporations and compared to Switzerland and Germany much less assets with public authorities. . .

Furthermore, the research confirms that German companies and banks were contributing significantly with direct and non direct investments to maintain the Apartheid regime in power and to prolong the suffering of the oppressed people. According to estimates made by the author, the gains made with their odious businesses amounted to 8.4 billion DM for the period 1971-93 (not considering trade). This is dirty money, for which compensation should be paid. Well-informed experts on the South African economy and administration have again and again asserted that during the critical phase of the late 1980s, the German and Swiss banks remained utterly loyal to the Apartheid regime - with high risk increases on the interest paid, though!

This material is being reposted for wider distribution by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC). APIC's primary objective is to widen the policy debate in the United States around African issues and the U.S. role in Africa, by concentrating on providing accessible policy-relevant information and analysis usable by a wide range of groups and individuals.


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Africa Online

By Haines Brown, CCSU History Department, emeritus

    In Pretoria on March 23rd INTELSAT sponsored a three-day pan-African summit, "Internet and New Technologies." Jointly sponsored by Telkom South Africa, the summit focused on the use of satellites to improve communications access across Africa.
    The summit draws communications operators, equipment manufacturers and Internet service providers from over 20 African countries to learn about the Internet backbone and multicasting services via satellite, TCP/IP enhancements for satellite transmission, interactive multimedia services, and Integrated VSAT/Wireless Local Loop solutions for rural telecommunications.
    Over 45 African countries already use INTELSAT. "Africa has experienced extensive growth in Internet services over the last year," according to Flavien Bachabi, INTELSAT Group Director for Africa."
    In addition to Internet, Telkom South Africa and operators in over 50 African nations use INTELSAT's satellite communications products for international and domestic services including public switched telephony, private business/ VSAT networks, video contribution and distribution. Over forty African communications entities hold over US$ 115 million shares in INTELSAT.
    INTELSAT owns and operates a global communications satellite system providing voice/data, Internet and video services to over 200 countries and territories via satellite. For more information, visit the INTELSAT Web site at www.intelsat.int.

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